A sour Trump says Israel should not have attacked Beirut as the US-Iran deal nears “very close”; at the same time, Israel and Iran prepare for retaliation. Here, in the Greek Courier, we already knew all this mumbo-jumbo long before it happened, and any major dude in the media business was also aware that the Israelis were going to sabotage Trump's latest desperate attempt to save the Midterms with a bad deal. How many times have we seen this already, and how possible is a potential US-Iran agreement to end the war?
What the other media outlets won't teach you, but this little blog will, is a lesson in common sense: the Western world has long stationed its geopolitical and economic outposts across the Middle East to protect its interests, and these outposts will not be intimidated by anyone's attempt to endanger them. Israel, and Greece (and its satellite Cyprus) are two similar examples, although Israel's leverage in the economic establishment is much more important than Greece's. Yet, as of late, these two countries have come so close to each other because they depend on each other to do the dirty work, which is a barrier to the expanding Muslim world—and especially Erdogan's Turkey. Israel and Greece are the policemen in the neighborhood. And you can't even pretend that you want to enforce any Abraham deals in good-old Palestine by dismantling first your local police stations.
Now, Trump is trying to strike a deal that is not favorable to Netanyahu, and that “deal” appeared to be nearing completion on Sunday, even as Israel did what we had predicted—carrying out an airstrike in Beirut and forcing both Israeli and Iranian officials to signal that they were preparing for consequences.
I don't know what kind of leverage Trump has with Netanyahu to urge him to stand down, because the deal is “very close.” In my opinion, it's only Bibi who's got any leverage on Trump, and that's also common sense. Geophrey Epstein was a Mossad operative. What he knew about Trump, Bibi also knows. Period.
Trump said—via a post on Truth Social and in additional comments reported by US media—that the US and Iran were “so close” to a peace deal and that the US-Iran framework would be electronically signed within “two to three hours,” according to Fox News correspondent Trey Yingst.
But Trump also said Israel’s attack on Beirut “should not have happened,” calling on all sides to stand down. He described the exchange Hezbollah is alleged to have prompted (BS) as “small and meaningless,” and argued the strike should not disrupt an “important process.” He added that the planned signing would reopen the Strait of Hormuz immediately, while warning of an “ultimate alternative” if the process fails. He also said the deal would not involve a cash exchange and that Iran’s uranium holdings would be handled later.
I am tired of words, and so is my audience, so let's cut to the chase and admit that this deal sucks for Israel, and West's favorite outpost cannot even fathom the nuclear uncertainty of such a deal. Needless to say, here is that Israel forced this war on a construction mogul-made President and intends to see a regime change and the return of the Shah or a pro-Israeli cadre in power. Period. Jews are scared shitless of Hezbollah, having been beaten at least once in their past encounters, and despite all the damage they have inflicted on them as of late, they know that Hezbollah's power will diminish only when the regime falls in Iran. Period.
Israeli officials said the strike in Beirut’s southern suburbs (Dahieh) targeted a Hezbollah infrastructure site. The Israeli military characterized the strike as “precise,” and said it conducted it in response to Hezbollah activity, including launches described in Israeli reporting as directed at northern Israel. In parallel, Israel’s Channel 12 reported that Israeli security officials were prepared for any Iranian response after the Beirut strike.
The timing is closely watched because multiple officials and mediators have said a preliminary framework or memorandum related to the conflict’s de-escalation was nearing finalization.
But Iran signals it will respond even as talks continue through intermediaries; Iran’s officials and affiliated reporting portrayed the Beirut strike as unacceptable and suggested retaliation remained possible. Iran’s parliament speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf said the attack in Dahieh showed Washington lacked will or ability to carry out commitments, and warned that progress would be impossible without it. A deputy inspector from Iran’s Khatam al-Anbiya joint military command said Israel’s strike “would not go unanswered.” Iranian political and security voices also argued that negotiations do not eliminate the battlefield dynamic.
Which practically means that the war may continue even if a deal is struck on several issues. What does that mean for the Strait of Hormuz? It means that the world is still hostage to geopolitical conflicts, a bus boy for President, and huge military-industrial interests.
At the same time, negotiators and intermediaries appeared to be active. Reuters reporting said Qatari negotiators flew to Tehran on Sunday morning as part of efforts to finalize an agreement. Additional reporting described Iran as reviewing a memorandum of understanding and indicated that messages relevant to negotiations were being relayed through Qatar.
Iran’s president Masoud Pezeshkian said decisions on war and talks are ultimately overseen by Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei and the Supreme National Security Council, implying that internal alignment—or disagreement—could affect negotiating pace.
So, are we standing in front of a breakthrough deal?
Based strictly on the information at hand, it is plausible that a preliminary agreement is close—but the evidence also shows how fragile it is. The apparent proximity of a signing is contrasted by immediate hostile events (a Beirut strike) and explicit retaliation warnings from Iranian officials, while Israel also signaled preparedness for Iranian action. That combination suggests a near-term diplomatic moment, not a settled end-state.
A “breakthrough” in the durable sense would normally imply, to begin with, clear, verifiable commitments (especially around nuclear constraints and enforcement), mechanisms for monitoring and compliance, and a de-escalation that survives retaliation cycles. Yeah, right—you can bet on that. Yet, details are still being described at a high level (e.g., reopening shipping, uranium-related handling, and the existence of a framework/memorandum). Without the text of the agreement, it’s not possible to confirm how comprehensive or enforceable it would be.
Did Israel “blow the deal to pieces” by bombing Beirut?
Senior US officials still expect the process to proceed despite the Beirut strike. One included account quotes US Secretary of War Pete Hegseth—who's dumber than Trump and a lot dumber than Miller—saying the Beirut strike was not expected to disrupt the preliminary memorandum and that plans were “on track.” Another included Reuters summary says mediators are optimistic the deal is “nearly over the line.”
So, cross your fingers, wait, and see. Israel may have complicated timing and increased risk, but the available reporting does not yet establish that the agreement is definitively dead. Injured, yes. DOA? Not yet.
Is the potential deal better than Obama’s JCPOA, or is it just a way out for Trump?
Barack Obama himself said any new deal was unlikely to significantly improve on the 2015 JCPOA, and cited the risk that force-based approaches won't solve underlying problems. But that is an assessment/opinion from Obama, not a side-by-side verification of what the new US-Iran framework would contain.
Meanwhile, another included account quotes Hegseth saying any arrangement would require nuclear material to be destroyed, removed, or downblended, with inspections and oversight, and that inspections would accompany dismantling. If accurate, that could differ in emphasis from the JCPOA’s approach and timeline. Still, the info does not provide enough detail to conclude whether the expected terms are objectively “better” than the JCPOA in terms of enforcement, duration, sanctions relief, and constraints.
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