In Iran, Who’s Arming Whom — and To What End?

The Greek Courier

Edited by Yiannis Damellos

March 28, 2026

What are we watching here but a tangled flow of weapons, intelligence, and strategy reshaping a regional war into a proxy-driven contest? The principal actors are Iran and Israel at the center of the fighting, with the United States backing Israel and Russia acting as a pivotal external supplier and intelligence partner to Iran. Other regional proxies — notably the Houthis in Yemen — are now striking directly at Israel, expanding the battlefield. Is this the prelude to a World War? Or the beginning of another Vietnam War for the United States of America?

Timeline and dynamics

What about the Russia-to-Iran drone transfers? U.S. and European officials report that Russia has sent an unspecified shipment of drones to Iran, potentially including upgraded variants developed after Russia’s use of Iranian designs in Ukraine. Although officials disagree on scale and intent, some view any delivery as small and symbolic, while others warn that the transfers could materially improve Iran’s strike and reconnaissance capabilities. If they haven't already...

For weeks, Iran has launched barrages of Shahed-style drones at Israel, Gulf neighbors, and U.S. bases in retaliation for U.S. and Israeli strikes on Iranian territory. Yesterday, such an attack on Prince Sultan Air Base injured 15 American soldiers and destroyed a crucial military aircraft, among others. Tehran already fields large stocks of Shahed drones; Russian upgrades reportedly add improved navigation, anti-jamming, reconnaissance and propulsion enhancements. 

For many weeks, Western assessments indicate active information-sharing. Moscow reportedly provided training, targeting insight, and electronic-warfare expertise, while Tehran has reciprocated with intelligence useful to Russia. That collaboration appears to predate the current Middle East war and intensified after shared battlefield experience in Ukraine.

In addition, European intelligence has tracked convoys labeled as humanitarian aid moving from Russia into Iran via Azerbaijan; officials say such convoys could — though are not confirmed to — conceal small drone shipments. Russian statements deny the allegations.

The same intel reports that Russian engineers adapted Iranian designs into variants that include non-explosive decoys to overwhelm air defenses, jet propulsion for greater speed, improved radio links and anti-jamming measures, and even AI navigation to permit operation without continuous external guidance.

Analogies to past conflicts

In Vietnam, external patrons (notably China and the Soviet Union) supplied materiel, training, and political support that sustained the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces over the years, enabling an asymmetric, protracted campaign that outlasted a technologically superior opponent. The current Iran-centered network resembles that model in key ways: outside powers supply weapons, training and intelligence to a state (Iran) and its proxies, enabling sustained asymmetric attacks against a militarily superior coalition.

Unlike the Cold War-era patronage of North Vietnam, today’s ties are less ideologically driven and more transactional. Russia is cooperating with Iran while simultaneously waging its own war in Ukraine, and the scale, visibility, and media environment differ markedly from the 1960s–70s. What is similar in both instances is the popular appeal of both wars in the US. Americans did not like Vietnam, and they sure don't like the Iran War. 

Is “Trump’s war” doomed due to Russian military aid?

Not exclusively and not in the short term. Foreign military aid complicates the U.S.-Israeli campaign and makes a decisive, quick victory less likely, but it is not the sole determinant of failure. Outside supplies can replenish weapons, improve tactics, and extend the conflict, transforming what might be a short punitive campaign into a prolonged war of attrition. Yet neither Trump nor the American economy can afford such an entanglement. If Trump fails to win the war in Iran, it will be because he should never have started it in the first place. There was another way to control Iran's nuclear program than War, but despite his aspirations for a Nobel Prize, he was the last candidate on earth to give peace a chance.

Now he has to reap the seeds he sowed, as even limited transfers of weapons can prolong Iran’s ability to strike back and resupply proxies. Furthermore. advanced drones, targeting data, and electronic warfare capabilities can blunt superior firepower and raise the cost of operations. To add to that, outside support signals that the Iranian state is not isolated, complicating efforts to force capitulation through military pressure alone.

 At the end of the day, domestic politics, logistics, international diplomacy, coalition cohesion, economic costs, and the risk of escalation (e.g., strikes on nuclear infrastructure or attacks on maritime routes) also constrain U.S. and Israeli options. Thus, while foreign aid can be a major factor, it combines with these limits to reduce the odds of a quick victory. 

What might Russia expect to gain?

By arming Iran, Russia positions itself as a significant geopolitical adversary to the U.S. in the Middle East, signaling the West that it is willing and able to support its partners in counterbalancing U.S. influence. Such a stance could effectively deter further Western actions and complicate coordinated responses to regional conflicts, while shifting some Western attention and resources away from Ukraine and tying up Western military logistics and political capital in the Middle East. This is a scenario that's coming right out of the Kremlin's chess playbook, as strengthening Tehran increases Moscow’s influence in the Middle East, giving Russia diplomatic and operational sway with Iran and its proxies. 

Also, in terms of military advancement, weapon testing and technological gains, Russia both benefits from shared technology (improved drone designs) and gains opportunities to refine systems and tactics through reciprocal exchanges. War is very beneficial for the Russian economy as well, as drone production agreements, joint facilities, and arms-for-technology deals can help sustain Russian defense-industry output under sanctions.

We are watching a modern proxyization of a regional war: direct combatants (Israel and Iran) supported and amplified by external patrons (the U.S. for Israel; Russia for Iran) and their local proxies (e.g., the Houthis). Foreign military aid makes the conflict more sustainable and asymmetric, raising the prospect of a protracted struggle rather than a quick resolution. While such aid does not alone guarantee defeat for U.S.-Israeli aims, it materially raises costs, complicates military objectives and advances Russian strategic interests by distracting adversaries, projecting influence and harvesting technological and political gains.