There is a much bigger story here than simply “Iran and Oman are close to a deal on Hormuz.”
To start, the situation around Hormuz is evolving into a crucial test of U.S. leverage rather than merely a shipping issue. Had the Trump administration not initiated the conflict, this predicament could have been avoided. Additionally, we are witnessing the emergence of a new defense pact—a regional security network formed by three key U.S. allies—triggered by concern over reports of diminishing U.S. munitions. These developments highlight a significant shift from a U.S.-centric regional security framework toward a more autonomous, multi-polar Middle East. While this transition is still in progress, the incentives clearly favor such a transformation.
Before we go on to analyze the situation, let's point out some facts: Hormuz has become a test of U.S. negotiating power, and the U.S. munitions problem matters politically even more than it does militarily right now. The administration's inability to handle such an important security issue, while fighting a war, awakened regional governments, like Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan, to the fact that Washington has finite capacity and may have to prioritize among theaters.
But it's not just the uncertainty about the U.S. security guarantee that plays out here. Although their new pact is not necessarily an anti-American alliance, it is an attempt to create an additional security layer that does not depend entirely on Washington. There is indeed a vacuum — but rather a security vacuum than a complete power vacuum. The really interesting question is whether this becomes a regional security bloc system: Turkey-Pakistan-Saudi Arabia on one side, Iran and its partners on another, with the Gulf states and other countries trying to remain flexible. And there is a very important caveat: we should not interpret the Saudi-Turkish-Pakistani pact as evidence that these three countries have suddenly aligned strategically on Iran. Their interests are much more complicated than that.
Iran is trying to turn the Strait of Hormuz into a bargaining instrument
If Tehran can emerge from the war with some recognized role in managing traffic, that would be a major strategic gain for Iran and another defeat for Trump. But that's not all it wants. What it wants is hidden in the words of Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi, who said Iran and Oman were “very close” to agreement on a new shipping route through the Strait of Hormuz but that reopening the strait "depended on other conditions".
That is extremely important.
Iran is effectively saying: Hormuz is not merely a maritime-security question. It is part of the political settlement of the war.
The proposed Iran-Oman deal appears to envision a temporary shipping arrangement, with Iran having a role on the Iranian side of the strait and Oman on the Omani side. Reuters has reported that earlier versions of the proposal could give Tehran significant control over vessels entering the Gulf — something Washington has explicitly opposed.
That creates an extraordinary situation.
For decades, the basic U.S. position has been that Iran cannot be permitted to turn Hormuz into an Iranian-controlled toll gate, while Iran's position increasingly appears to be: We cannot be expected to reopen Hormuz for free after being attacked; our security and political demands have to be addressed first.
Those are fundamentally different concepts. And Iran has demonstrated that it can impose enormous costs without actually needing to permanently close the strait. That is the strategic lesson.
So, if you think, as I am, that there is a problem for the United States in Hormuz, you are correct — but I would distinguish between an immediate military problem and a longer-term strategic problem.
Nonetheless, the immediate problem for the rest of us is obvious: shipping.
Before the war, Hormuz carried roughly a fifth of global oil and gas shipments. The attacks and restrictions have disrupted that traffic and contributed to higher energy prices and inflation across the globe. The UAE says 15 vessels associated with its national oil company have been struck since the conflict began.
But the deeper U.S. problem is precedent. If the eventual settlement says, in effect, that Iran gets a recognized role in controlling or regulating traffic through Hormuz in exchange for reopening it, then Tehran has converted military pressure into a diplomatic concession. That would be a substantial Iranian victory even if Iran ultimately makes significant concessions elsewhere.
It would also raise a difficult question for Washington: Who actually guarantees freedom of navigation in the Persian Gulf?
If the answer becomes “Iran, Oman and regional states, through an arrangement negotiated without Washington dictating the terms,” that is a reduction in U.S. primacy.
That is why the Hormuz negotiations matter far beyond oil.
And then comes the munitions story
Reuters reported Aug. 4 that the U.S. Army had used “virtually all” of its stocks of ATACMS and Precision Strike Missiles during the five-month Iran war, according to sources familiar with the data. Reuters also reported earlier that the war was already forcing delays in weapons deliveries to some European countries.
That doesn't mean the United States is running out of weapons. It means something more subtle: The U.S. has discovered that a major regional war can consume some categories of high-end munitions much faster than the industrial base can replenish them.
That matters enormously to allies.
Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Pakistan, India, Israel, Japan, South Korea and European governments don't just look at America's total military inventory. They ask: “If we get into a crisis next year, will the United States have enough interceptors, missiles and precision weapons to help us?”
That is a different calculation. And this is where the munitions story connects directly to the new defense arrangements.
The Saudi-Turkey-Pakistan agreement is not a coincidence
Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan signed the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement on Aug. 7. The core principle is that an armed attack against one is considered an attack against all three. Reuters describes it as a defensive pact, while AP likewise reports that the agreement commits the three countries to collective defense. This is big. But I would be careful about calling it a new “anti-Iran alliance.” The three countries have very different interests.
Saudi Arabia
To begin with Saudi Arabia, well, among other things that petrodollars buy, it needs security. But Riyadh also increasingly wants strategic autonomy. The Saudi leadership has spent years trying to avoid being trapped in somebody else's war. That is particularly true regarding Iran. And although Trump trapped it, it still wants the U.S. relationship, and after all, Trump has offered the Prince nuclear technology. But the Prince turned greedy. Now, it also wants Chinese economic investment. And better relations with Iran. It wants Turkey and Pakistan for protection. Ankara has advanced weaponry and Islamabad nuclear deterrence. Also, it wants its own military-industrial capability. That is not abandonment of Washington. It is hedging.
Turkey
Turkey is arguably the most strategically interesting member. Turkey is a NATO member, possesses one of the largest militaries in the region and has been developing an increasingly independent defense industry. Ankara doesn't want Iran dominating the region. But it also doesn't want the United States or Israel determining the entire regional security architecture. Turkey therefore has an incentive to promote a regional balance of power in which Ankara itself is one of the poles. Chatham House has essentially made this point: the war in Iran is creating space for Turkey's regional role to expand, particularly as Ankara deepens its relationships with Gulf states. So Turkey isn't necessarily leaving the American system. It is trying to become more important inside and alongside it.
Pakistan
Pakistan may be the most underappreciated component. It has something Saudi Arabia doesn't: a nuclear deterrent. It also has a long-standing military relationship with Saudi Arabia. And Pakistan has already demonstrated a willingness to put forces into Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia publicly acknowledged in April that Pakistani fighter and support aircraft had arrived at a Saudi air base under their existing Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement. At the same time, Pakistan has been acting as a mediator in the Iran conflict. Saudi Arabia explicitly praised Pakistani mediation efforts in June. So Islamabad is doing something quite sophisticated: It is simultaneously maintaining relationships with Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United States while increasing its security role in the Gulf. That gives Pakistan leverage.
So is a new bloc emerging?
Potentially — but we can't call it a bloc yet. Rather, the beginnings of a regional security network. That's a very important distinction. A true alliance requires things such as integrated command structures, basing arrangements, intelligence sharing, logistics, standardized weapons, agreed rules for military intervention, and clear definitions of what constitutes an attack. The new agreement reportedly doesn't yet provide all of that. Reuters specifically notes that its operational commitments remain relatively undefined.
But politically, the signal is powerful: Saudi Arabia is no longer comfortable assuming that its security must ultimately be guaranteed by Washington alone. That is the development we should watch.
And here's where the Hormuz story gets really interesting
Look at the geography.
Iran sits on one side of Hormuz. Oman sits on the other. Saudi Arabia and the UAE sit immediately to the west. Pakistan sits across the Arabian Sea. Turkey sits to the northwest. And the U.S. has traditionally been the external military guarantor of the entire system. Now imagine the regional governments looking at what has happened over the past five months.
Do you know what they see?
They see: Iran can attack shipping and strike Gulf infrastructure. Israel and the United States can launch enormous attacks on Iran. The United States can consume enormous quantities of precision munitions doing it. The war can disrupt their economies even when they didn't start it.
And they conclude: We need our own mechanism for managing the consequences. That is the logic behind regional hedging.
There is a vacuum — but it isn't simply an American vacuum
The old model:
U.S. security umbrella → Gulf stability → protected energy infrastructure → open Hormuz is under stress.
The emerging model may be:
Regional Middle powers → overlapping defense agreements → diplomatic mediation → local control of security → U.S./China/Russia as external partners
That is a very different Middle East.
The interesting thing is that nobody necessarily wants the United States to leave. Saudi Arabia doesn't. Turkey doesn't. Pakistan doesn't. The Gulf states certainly don't. What they increasingly appear to want is the ability to say: “We need you, but we don't want our survival to depend entirely on you.”
That is a very different proposition.
Iran's strategy may therefore be working even if Iran doesn't “win”
This is another important point. Suppose the war ends with Iran retaining its government and substantial military capabilities. As Hormuz is reopening, Iran will be receiving some role in maritime security. The U.S. will be lifting its blockade and Gulf states will become more cautious about confrontation with Tehran. As Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan build a regional defense mechanism, Iran could reasonably claim it changed the regional balance of power, even if it suffered enormous military losses. That's because wars aren't necessarily won by destroying the enemy's military. Sometimes they're won by changing the political architecture that exists afterward.
But there is a paradox in the Saudi-Turkish-Pakistani pact
This is where I think the story becomes especially interesting. The three countries are all Sunni-majority states. Iran is Shiite-majority. So at first glance, this looks like: Sunni bloc vs. Iran.
But that interpretation is too simplistic. Saudi Arabia has been pursuing reconciliation with Iran. Pakistan has extensive relations with Iran and has been mediating between Washington and Tehran. Turkey wants influence but does not want an uncontrolled Iranian collapse. And none of these governments wants to be dragged into an enormous regional war. So the pact may actually be intended to prevent war rather than prepare for it.
The message could be: “Don't attack us because now an attack on one of us potentially brings the other two into the equation.”That's classic deterrence. And deterrence can actually facilitate diplomacy.
Trump's war and resource allocation could accelerate a New World Order
The perception of finite U.S. military capacity is one of several factors accelerating regional self-insurance. The sequence is important. The war demonstrates that high-end weapons can be consumed extremely rapidly. Reuters says the U.S. has essentially exhausted some categories of long-range Army missiles. U.S. weapons are therefore not infinitely available to allies. Earlier reporting already indicated delays in deliveries to European customers because of the Iran war. Regional Middle Powers realize that they cannot assume Washington will simultaneously defend everybody. That's particularly important if the U.S. is also trying to deter China in the Indo-Pacific and Russia in Europe. They therefore build alternative relationships. Not only among them, but with other superpowers as well.
If this happens, Trump will have achieved something unprecedented: Gradually transforming a unipolar system to become multipolar. I wonder what his MAGA minions would think about that.
And, in fact, the really serious U.S. problem isn't Hormuz itself. Think about it. The United States can reopen Hormuz militarily. The U.S. Navy is enormously powerful. The U.S. Air Force remains enormously powerful. Iran cannot defeat the United States in a conventional war. But, that's not the issue. The issue is how much political and military capital Washington has to spend to maintain the old system.
If keeping Hormuz open requires naval and air-defense deployments, missile strikes, replenishment of expensive precision weapons, protection of Gulf bases, protection of Israel, defense of Saudi Arabia;and the UAE, protection of shipping, support for Europe and deterrence against China, then the United States faces a resource-allocation problem. And regional actors notice.
This may actually be the beginning of “regionalization” of Middle Eastern security
I think that's the most important phrase. Not American withdrawal. Not Iranian dominance. Not a new Sunni NATO. Rather: Regionalization. Middle powers like Saudi Arabia saying: We need our own deterrence. Turkey saying: We can provide security capacity. Pakistan saying: We can provide military depth and mediation. Iran proposing that regional countries should negotiate regional security. Oman and Qatar saying: We can mediate.
And the United States increasingly becoming one powerful participant in a regional system rather than the unquestioned manager of that system.
That would be a major geopolitical change.
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