

November 21, 2026
By Yiannis Damellos and Mars Strangelove Jr.
Ten years after the Brexit referendum, Britain and the European Union are moving toward a conclusion that geography never allowed them to escape: they remain bound by the same security risks, exposed to many of the same economic shocks and dependent on one another in ways that political separation could not erase.
The latest EU–UK summit in Brussels was therefore about more than repairing a damaged relationship. It was another step toward rebuilding a common European framework for security, economic resilience and political cooperation.
The November 20 meeting between British Prime Minister Andy Burnham, European Council President António Costa and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen produced commitments covering defence cooperation, maritime security, military mobility, Ukraine, cyber threats and the defence industry. The two sides also agreed to deepen coordination against hybrid threats and foreign information manipulation. Britain is moving closer to participation in EU military-mobility and logistics projects, while negotiations have concluded on a framework for UK participation in civilian EU security and defence missions.
The timing is not accidental. Europe is confronting a security environment in which Russia's war against Ukraine, instability in the Middle East, attacks on critical infrastructure and uncertainty about the future of transatlantic relations all demand greater coordination. The next two years are unlikely to offer European governments the luxury of assuming that crises will arrive one at a time, or that every emergency will come with advance warning. The practical response is to strengthen the arrangements already available rather than wait for another shock to expose the gaps.
Britain has particular reasons to reconsider the distance created by Brexit. It remains a major European military power and a NATO member, and NATO—not the European Union—continues to provide the foundation of its collective defence. But leaving the EU also placed Britain outside many of the Union's developing mechanisms for coordinating defence-industrial policy, military mobility, crisis management and economic security. London can remain under NATO's collective-defence umbrella while still finding itself less connected to the day-to-day decisions shaping Europe's wider security architecture. The new agreements begin to address that separation without requiring Britain to rejoin the Union.
The economic dimension is just as significant. Brexit did not end trade between Britain and Europe, but it introduced new administrative and regulatory barriers into a relationship built over decades of integrated supply chains, shared standards and cross-border business. The latest summit seeks to reduce some of that friction. Britain and the EU have advanced negotiations on a common sanitary and phytosanitary area for food and agricultural products, agreed to link their emissions-trading systems and continued work on energy cooperation and access to the EU internal electricity market. They also agreed to pursue closer cooperation on competition policy and economic security. These are technical arrangements, but their consequences are felt by exporters, farmers, manufacturers, consumers and investors.
The November 20 meeting between British Prime Minister Andy Burnham, European Council President António Costa and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen produced commitments covering defence cooperation, maritime security, military mobility, Ukraine, cyber threats and the defence industry. The two sides also agreed to deepen coordination against hybrid threats and foreign information manipulation. Britain is moving closer to participation in EU military-mobility and logistics projects, while negotiations have concluded on a framework for UK participation in civilian EU security and defence missions.
The timing is not accidental. Europe is confronting a security environment in which Russia's war against Ukraine, instability in the Middle East, attacks on critical infrastructure and uncertainty about the future of transatlantic relations all demand greater coordination. The next two years are unlikely to offer European governments the luxury of assuming that crises will arrive one at a time, or that every emergency will come with advance warning. The practical response is to strengthen the arrangements already available rather than wait for another shock to expose the gaps.
Britain has particular reasons to reconsider the distance created by Brexit. It remains a major European military power and a NATO member, and NATO—not the European Union—continues to provide the foundation of its collective defence. But leaving the EU also placed Britain outside many of the Union's developing mechanisms for coordinating defence-industrial policy, military mobility, crisis management and economic security. London can remain under NATO's collective-defence umbrella while still finding itself less connected to the day-to-day decisions shaping Europe's wider security architecture. The new agreements begin to address that separation without requiring Britain to rejoin the Union.
The economic dimension is just as significant. Brexit did not end trade between Britain and Europe, but it introduced new administrative and regulatory barriers into a relationship built over decades of integrated supply chains, shared standards and cross-border business. The latest summit seeks to reduce some of that friction. Britain and the EU have advanced negotiations on a common sanitary and phytosanitary area for food and agricultural products, agreed to link their emissions-trading systems and continued work on energy cooperation and access to the EU internal electricity market. They also agreed to pursue closer cooperation on competition policy and economic security. These are technical arrangements, but their consequences are felt by exporters, farmers, manufacturers, consumers and investors.
There is also a political message in the language of the summit. The leaders repeatedly invoked democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the rules-based international order. Their statement reaffirmed support for Ukraine and described its security as Europe's security. It also condemned the Houthi escalation against Saudi Arabia and attacks threatening civilian shipping in the Red Sea. This is not merely a list of diplomatic positions. It reflects an effort to treat European security as an interconnected system, extending from the eastern flank and the Baltic to the Mediterranean and the maritime routes beyond it.
The relationship is also being rebuilt at the level of people and institutions. Britain is set to rejoin Erasmus+ in 2027, and the two sides have concluded negotiations on a youth experience scheme that would allow up to 100,000 young people from each side to live in the other territory for work, study or travel. They will also work toward an agreement on student tuition fees. These initiatives cannot reverse the disruption Brexit caused to universities, young workers and cultural exchange, but they acknowledge that a durable partnership requires more than meetings between ministers.
None of this amounts to a reversal of Brexit, nor does it create a European army or replace NATO. The political and institutional differences remain, and the agreements will require implementation, negotiation and funding. But the direction is unmistakable: Britain and the EU are trying to restore practical cooperation in areas where separation has made coordination more difficult and where the cost of continued fragmentation has become harder to justify.
Brexit was presented as a recovery of national control. A decade later, the security and economic realities of the continent are pushing London and Brussels toward renewed cooperation. The challenge now is to make that cooperation durable enough to withstand the next crisis. Europe cannot eliminate surprises. It can, however, make sure that when they arrive, its governments are not trying to manage them separately.


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