

November 21, 2026
By Yiannis Damellos and Mars Strangelove Jr.
The latest escalation has been difficult to ignore. Reuters reports that on November 20, Saudi Arabia said it intercepted three ballistic missiles fired toward Riyadh, the second attack on the capital in several days. The previous day's strike damaged the headquarters of the Public Investment Fund, the kingdom's sovereign wealth fund, in one of the most visible demonstrations yet that the conflict can reach the heart of the Saudi economic establishment. The Saudi-led coalition has responded with strikes on Houthi positions, including facilities in Sanaa and the Red Sea port of Hodeidah. The Houthis, in turn, have threatened Saudi ports, shipping and airspace.
The Houthis are not a conventional army, and that is precisely what makes them difficult to contain. They emerged from Yemen's political and religious conflicts, fought their way into control of much of the country's north and developed years of battlefield experience against a Saudi-led military coalition. Their methods combine irregular warfare, mobile launch systems, dispersed infrastructure, local knowledge and increasingly sophisticated missiles and drones. Mountainous terrain and the fragmented political geography of Yemen have helped them survive campaigns that might have destroyed a more conventional force.

The Houthis are not a conventional army, and that is precisely what makes them difficult to contain. They emerged from Yemen's political and religious conflicts, fought their way into control of much of the country's north and developed years of battlefield experience against a Saudi-led military coalition. Their methods combine irregular warfare, mobile launch systems, dispersed infrastructure, local knowledge and increasingly sophisticated missiles and drones. Mountainous terrain and the fragmented political geography of Yemen have helped them survive campaigns that might have destroyed a more conventional force.

Their military development has also been more systematic than the image of a poorly equipped insurgency suggests. A Reuters investigation published in October described how Iranian assistance helped the Houthis develop the expertise to assemble and deploy increasingly advanced weapons locally. Former Yemeni military engineers and locally trained specialists have helped build capabilities that are not entirely dependent on shipments arriving from Iran. This development is strategically important: disrupting supply routes may slow the movement, but it does not necessarily dismantle the knowledge and production capacity it has acquired.
According to The National, the current missile campaign also illustrates a different kind of calculation. Saudi defence analysts have described a possible “one-a-night” approach: limited missile launches intended to keep air-defence systems on alert and force the kingdom to expend costly interceptors over time. The tactic does not require the Houthis to overwhelm Saudi Arabia in a single spectacular barrage. It requires them to maintain pressure, preserve their own limited stockpile and make the defender pay repeatedly for every incoming threat. It is a war of endurance as much as a contest of firepower.

According to The National, the current missile campaign also illustrates a different kind of calculation. Saudi defence analysts have described a possible “one-a-night” approach: limited missile launches intended to keep air-defence systems on alert and force the kingdom to expend costly interceptors over time. The tactic does not require the Houthis to overwhelm Saudi Arabia in a single spectacular barrage. It requires them to maintain pressure, preserve their own limited stockpile and make the defender pay repeatedly for every incoming threat. It is a war of endurance as much as a contest of firepower.

This exposes a structural problem for Riyadh, says The National. Saudi Arabia has advanced aircraft, sophisticated missile systems and substantial defence spending. But protecting a vast territory against a combination of ballistic missiles, low-cost drones and irregular attacks is a different challenge from purchasing advanced equipment. The kingdom's separate air-defence networks, dependence on expensive interceptors and need for outside technical support have become increasingly visible. Analysts are now calling for a more integrated Gulf air-defence system, while Saudi Arabia looks to European, South Korean and other suppliers for additional capabilities. Ukrainian specialists have also been sought for advice on countering drones.
The danger extends beyond military installations. By threatening ports, commercial shipping, aviation and energy infrastructure, the Houthis can increase the economic cost of the war without having to defeat the Saudi armed forces in a conventional confrontation. The Red Sea and the Bab al-Mandab Strait are critical maritime corridors. Any sustained disruption would affect trade well beyond the immediate region. The Houthi threat therefore reaches into the kingdom's investment ambitions, its transport networks and its effort to present itself as a stable destination for international business.

The danger extends beyond military installations. By threatening ports, commercial shipping, aviation and energy infrastructure, the Houthis can increase the economic cost of the war without having to defeat the Saudi armed forces in a conventional confrontation. The Red Sea and the Bab al-Mandab Strait are critical maritime corridors. Any sustained disruption would affect trade well beyond the immediate region. The Houthi threat therefore reaches into the kingdom's investment ambitions, its transport networks and its effort to present itself as a stable destination for international business.

The Iran war has given this confrontation a wider strategic dimension. The Houthis are aligned with Tehran and their attacks can serve Iranian regional interests by forcing Saudi Arabia to defend another front. But alignment does not prove that every Houthi operation is directly ordered by Iran. The movement has its own leadership, domestic agenda and military calculations. Its ability to act independently is part of the problem: even if Iran's capacity to supply or direct regional partners is weakened, the Houthis retain their own reasons and capabilities to continue fighting.
Saudi Arabia is not on the verge of military collapse, and the Houthis have not demonstrated that they can defeat the kingdom in a conventional war. But that is not the measure of their success. They can impose costs, disrupt normal activity, force expensive defensive responses and keep a much wealthier neighbour under persistent pressure. The kingdom's challenge now is to build a defence system capable of dealing with an adversary that does not need to win a conventional battle to make the war increasingly expensive.
Saudi Arabia is not on the verge of military collapse, and the Houthis have not demonstrated that they can defeat the kingdom in a conventional war. But that is not the measure of their success. They can impose costs, disrupt normal activity, force expensive defensive responses and keep a much wealthier neighbour under persistent pressure. The kingdom's challenge now is to build a defence system capable of dealing with an adversary that does not need to win a conventional battle to make the war increasingly expensive.

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