Wednesday, November 18, 2026

The World is Not Theirs to Divide


Three powerful men seek a new world order.
The world has other ideas.
Commentary by Yiannis Damellos and Mars Strangelove Jr.
November 18, 2026
The spectacle of Donald Trump bringing Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping into the same diplomatic frame raises a question far larger than the outcome of any single meeting: are three authoritarian leaders attempting to establish a new understanding of the world, one in which the interests of smaller nations, democratic governments and international institutions become negotiable? The danger is not that diplomacy is taking place. Diplomacy is necessary. The danger is the assumption that three tyrants of such poor calibre can decide the future of everyone else.
Trump arrives at this moment politically weakened at home, following the midterm defeat of his party and the prospect of renewed congressional scrutiny. He wants deals he can present as historic achievements, but if the price of a fragile peace is simply another war waiting to happen, what is the point of making it in the first place? Trump is not unaware of who his new potential partners are. He is a spitting image of them. It's a wonder that the Western media seem surprised by his actions.
Putin arrives with a war still raging in Ukraine, an international reputation deeply damaged by the invasion and an urgent need for a settlement that can be presented as something other than the reward for aggression. He wants recognition and relief from isolation. Trump can give Putin exactly what he wants: Russia's return to the Big Game.
Xi, meanwhile, has the luxury of time. China's economic, technological and military weight continues to grow. Beijing can afford to negotiate patiently, absorb Western technology and watch its competitors confront political instability and strategic uncertainty. Xi wants strategic room, economic advantage and a world in which American power is less able to dictate the terms. For him, Taiwan remains the prize that could redefine the balance of power in Asia.
Their interests overlap, but they are not identical. That is not necessarily a partnership. It is a negotiation among competing powers, each seeking to extract something from the others.
But the rest of the world is not standing still. Europe, Canada, India, Australia, Japan and the countries of Southeast Asia have their own interests, their own security concerns and their own diplomatic relationships. They are not obliged to accept a division of influence simply because Washington, Moscow and Beijing find it convenient. They can make agreements with one another, diversify their economic relationships, strengthen regional cooperation and refuse to grant any of the three a blank cheque. They may disagree on many issues, but they share a fundamental interest: preserving the right to make their own decisions. Trump's own policies have helped bring them to this point.
This is where the middle powers become essential. Their strength does not come from matching the military or economic scale of the superpowers. It comes from cooperation, trade, diplomacy, international law and the ability to build coalitions. Canada and Europe do not need to choose between Washington and Beijing on every issue. India does not need to surrender its strategic independence. Australia and Japan do not need to abandon their security commitments to accommodate a great-power bargain. ASEAN countries do not need to accept a future in which they are told which side of a new geopolitical line they belong on.
For the middle powers, the lesson should be simple: cooperate where interests coincide, resist where sovereignty is threatened, and never confuse access to powerful leaders with influence over the decisions they make. A country that negotiates alone with a superpower is vulnerable. Countries that coordinate their positions before negotiating with superpowers have leverage.
And what of Ukraine? There is a growing fear that Ukraine will become the sacrificial lamb in Trump's endgame. But Putin cannot acquire international legitimacy merely by sitting at a negotiating table. Ending the war is the necessary first step, but a durable peace must respect Ukraine's sovereignty and cannot turn military aggression into an accepted method of acquiring territory. A settlement negotiated over the heads of Ukrainians and imposed on them by outsiders would not resolve the crisis. It would institutionalize the next one.
The same principle applies to any peace proposal emerging from this diplomatic theatre. A plan that stops the fighting is worth examining. But its terms are essential. If peace requires Ukraine to surrender its future, if security guarantees are empty, or if the aggressor receives rewards while the victim carries the cost, then the agreement is not a triumph of diplomacy. It is a dangerous precedent. A peace plan can become a Trojan horse for the destruction of the principles it claims to defend.
The same principle should apply to Gaza, but the issue receives far less attention.
There is also an American political reality that neither Moscow nor Beijing should underestimate. Trump does not own the United States, its Constitution or its foreign policy. The Democratic Party now has a strengthened congressional position, and the prospect of investigations, hearings and legislative resistance makes it considerably harder for the White House to turn a personal diplomatic understanding into an unquestioned national settlement. Trump and Stephen Miller will learn the hard way that American democracy is not simply a president's signature on an agreement. It includes Congress, the courts, the press, public opinion and the right of voters to change their government.
By January, much of what is discussed in Shenzhen may already look different. Political circumstances change, military realities evolve, markets react and governments reconsider their positions. A photograph of three leaders together does not create a permanent world order. Nor does a declaration make a bargain sustainable if the countries expected to live with it refuse to accept its terms.
We in Canada, alongside the other middle powers, should resist the temptation to panic, but we must not be complacent either. We should talk to one another, strengthen our institutions, protect our economic independence and insist that international agreements respect the sovereignty of the countries affected by them. We should welcome genuine diplomacy without confusing it with a coronation of three authoritarian figures.
This is no ordinary bromance. After all, even a regional power such as Iran has demonstrated that a superpower like the United States cannot always dictate the outcome of a confrontation, particularly when its adversaries have powerful external partners. Meanwhile, a country devastated by invasion, Ukraine, has proved a formidable adversary to Russia, sustained by its own resistance and substantial Western military assistance.
To Trump, Putin and Xi, the world is a board game. But not to us. Ukraine is not a bargaining chip. Taiwan is not a concession to be exchanged. Europe is not a spectator, nor should it become the next battlefield. Canada, India, Australia and Southeast Asia are not pieces waiting to be moved. If the United States, Russia and China want to make a deal that affects the rest of the world, they should take it to the United Nations and ask the international community whether it agrees.
Three leaders can meet. Three governments can negotiate. But they cannot claim the right to rule a world that does not belong to them.

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