Two Dictators and a Wannabe: The Great-Power Bargain of the 21st Century

November 14, 2026

By Mars Strangelove Jr. and Yiannis Damellos

Why would the supposed leader of the Free World want a place at a global power-bargaining table with his two authoritarian adversaries? It's like FDR seeking a summit with Hitler and Hirohito to negotiate the outcome of World War II. Now we have three presidents, three nuclear superpowers and a negotiating table that could reshape the international order. Putin wants to control European affairs, Xi wants global influence, and Trump wants the recognition his own citizens deny him but a League of Tyrants would gladly grant him. The rest of us should be paying attention, because these three are making the globe look like a prison cell.

The announcement that Donald Trump, Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping will hold an unprecedented trilateral meeting on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Shenzhen, China, is more than an extraordinary diplomatic gathering. It is a glimpse into a possible new international arrangement in which the world's most powerful leaders seek to settle major questions through direct negotiations, with little regard for the interests of smaller nations or the international institutions established to protect them.

The White House says the discussions will focus on nuclear weapons and the war with Iran. No agreements are expected, and American officials describe the gathering as the beginning of a conversation. Yet the political significance is already considerable. For the first time, the leaders of the three largest nuclear powers will sit together, each arriving with a different agenda and a calculation of what the encounter can deliver. The question is whether the meeting will advance international security or encourage a return to great-power politics, where military and economic strength determine who gets to write the rules.


Putin: Recognition without accountability

For Vladimir Putin, the meeting is already a diplomatic achievement. After nearly five years of war against Ukraine, Western sanctions and growing dependence on Beijing, the Russian president will appear alongside the American and Chinese leaders as an equal participant in discussions about global security. That is precisely the image the Kremlin wants to project: Russia is not isolated, its president remains indispensable, and Moscow still belongs among the powers deciding the world's future.

The benefits extend beyond appearances. Putin wants sanctions relief, greater international legitimacy and recognition of Russia's strategic interests. His partnership with Xi has become increasingly important as China purchases Russian energy and supplies technologies that help sustain Moscow's military-industrial capacity. A meeting with Trump and Xi offers another opportunity to demonstrate that Russia cannot simply be excluded from international diplomacy. And although Trump says Ukraine will not be discussed at the trilateral gathering, Putin gains something valuable from the symbolism alone: the suggestion that the future of European security can be negotiated among powerful capitals rather than by those whose territory and lives are at stake.

Xi: The host who wants to be the global arbiter

Xi Jinping has perhaps the most sophisticated diplomatic calculation. China does not need to enter an alliance with either Washington or Moscow to benefit from the meeting. It needs recognition of its position as an indispensable global power. Hosting Trump and Putin in Shenzhen provides precisely that opportunity, while allowing Beijing to present itself as a central participant in decisions about nuclear security, international trade and regional stability.

China also holds considerable leverage over Russia. Moscow's growing economic dependence on Beijing has strengthened Xi's position, while their shared opposition to what they describe as Western dominance gives the partnership a strategic dimension. But Xi has little reason to accept Trump's proposed nuclear arrangement on Washington's terms. China's estimated arsenal of more than 600 warheads remains substantially smaller than the American and Russian stockpiles, each exceeding 5,000. Beijing is unlikely to accept restrictions that fail to account for that imbalance. Xi can therefore enjoy the prestige of the gathering without necessarily accepting the obligations Trump wants to impose.

There is also a contradiction in China's position. Beijing frequently presents itself as a defender of multilateralism and international cooperation, yet a meeting dominated by three powerful leaders risks reinforcing precisely the kind of exclusive diplomacy that smaller countries fear. Xi may be hosting the conversation, but he also wants to shape the rules under which future conversations take place.


Trump: The wannabe emperor of the negotiating table

Donald Trump arrives with a different set of ambitions. Unlike Putin and Xi, he leads a country with a constitutional system, independent institutions and democratic traditions that he has repeatedly challenged. His authoritarian ambitions should not be confused with the established systems of personal rule in Moscow and Beijing. Nevertheless, his political instinct is unmistakable: concentrate power, weaken institutional restraints and make international relations revolve around personal deals with other powerful leaders.

For Trump, the Shenzhen gathering offers several opportunities. He wants a new nuclear arms agreement that includes China, despite Beijing's reluctance. He also wants to discuss Iran with the two countries that maintain important strategic relationships with Tehran. China has substantial economic influence, while Russia has military, intelligence and diplomatic ties with the Iranian government. Their cooperation could be useful to Washington, although neither is obliged to deliver what Trump wants.

But there is another prize: the presidential image. Trump wants to be seen as the man capable of bringing together the world's most powerful leaders and negotiating agreements that previous administrations could not achieve. The spectacle of sitting between Xi and Putin reinforces his preferred vision of international leadership, in which personal relationships between heads of state take precedence over diplomatic processes and institutional constraints. The difference is that Putin and Xi already command highly centralized authoritarian systems. Trump still has to contend with the American Constitution, Congress, the courts, elections and a society that has not surrendered its democratic institutions.


The bargain: Three agendas, one dangerous overlap

There is no evidence that the three leaders have agreed on a common strategy or intend to divide the world into exclusive spheres of influence. Their interests remain competitive, and their disagreements are substantial. But their individual ambitions create a potentially consequential overlap: each has something to gain from a world in which the strongest powers negotiate directly and smaller countries have less influence over the decisions affecting them.

For Putin, that means recognition and an opportunity to escape diplomatic isolation. For Xi, it means international prestige and a stronger claim to global leadership. For Trump, it means the possibility of presenting himself as the architect of a new international order. The proposed nuclear discussions offer a legitimate opportunity to reduce the danger of an uncontrolled arms race. Yet the expiration of the New START treaty in February has already removed the last remaining treaty-based limits on the American and Russian nuclear arsenals. A conversation is welcome, but a photograph of three presidents is not arms control.

The war in Ukraine presents an even more troubling dimension. Zelenskyy has expressed concern that the gathering could become a platform for discussing his country's future without Kyiv's participation. Meanwhile, Trump's decision to leave Ukraine off the trilateral agenda does little to reassure European governments. Europe is directly exposed to the consequences of Russian aggression, yet European leaders will not be at this particular table. The lesson is uncomfortable: the countries most affected by great-power decisions may not be the countries making them.


The world beyond the negotiating room

There is a historical shadow over this gathering. Comparisons with the 1945 Yalta Conference are inevitable, although the circumstances are different. At Yalta, the leaders of the United States, Britain and the Soviet Union discussed the postwar settlement and the division of occupied Germany. The decisions shaped the lives of millions and helped establish the geopolitical divisions of the Cold War. The Shenzhen meeting is not another Yalta, but the underlying question is familiar: can the world's strongest powers decide the future of others without giving those countries a meaningful voice?

The consequences would extend well beyond Ukraine. Taiwan, the Middle East, European security, nuclear proliferation and the future of international trade all sit within the broader strategic calculations of Washington, Beijing and Moscow. Smaller countries, developing economies and international institutions risk becoming spectators in a system increasingly shaped by military power, economic dependency and personal political relationships.

The irony is that the world does not need another arrangement in which powerful men decide what is best for everyone else. It needs stronger international institutions, enforceable agreements, respect for national sovereignty and democratic accountability. Nuclear disarmament deserves serious negotiations. Ending wars deserves genuine diplomacy. But neither objective should become an excuse for sacrificing the rights of countries and populations that are not represented at the table.

Three leaders are preparing to meet in Shenzhen. Two command authoritarian political systems; the third has shown an increasingly troubling appetite for authoritarian power. Their interests are not identical, and no grand bargain has yet been struck. But each has an opportunity to walk away with something: Putin with recognition, Xi with influence and Trump with the appearance of global leadership.

The danger is not necessarily that these three men will agree on everything. It is that they may increasingly agree on who should be allowed to decide. And that is a bargain the rest of the world should be very reluctant to accept.