Editorial
October 18, 2026
Marc Carney saw the storm coming. Now it is knocking on Europe’s door
As Washington threatens retaliation against European companies over Elon Musk's satellite juggernaut, Trump's easing of pressure on Moscow, combined with Europe’s dependence on American technology, highlights the strategic risks of an alliance that lacks sufficient alternatives and real incentives. If it weren't for Trump's affinity for authoritarian regimes, we might not be having this discussion. Perhaps on November 5th, we will be focusing on impeachment rather than diversification. However, given the current pressure point, it is essential to consider taking proactive measures in the face of danger.
Washington's warning to Europe over Starlink exposes a contradiction at the heart of the transatlantic alliance: the United States expects access to European markets while threatening economic consequences when European regulators try to strengthen their own technological capabilities and security architecture.
In an interview with the Financial Times published October 18, US Ambassador to the EU Andrew Puzder warned that European companies could face “very devastating” retaliation if Brussels proceeds with plans to reserve part of the radio spectrum used for direct satellite-to-smartphone connections for European operators. The European Commission says its proposal would encourage new suppliers and diversify the market while remaining open to non-European companies.
While Washington presents the dispute as a question of fair competition and warns that European regulation could disadvantage American firms, Brussels argues that developing alternatives is necessary to strengthen European technological capacity.
But when the world's largest market is invoked as a potential instrument of retaliation, the dispute becomes more than a regulatory argument. It raises the question of whether economic integration still serves both partners when one can use its market power to constrain the other's choices.
The vulnerability is no longer theoretical
Europe's dependence on American technology has become a strategic concern, not simply an industrial one.
The war in Ukraine has demonstrated how much modern defence relies on satellite communications, intelligence and digital infrastructure. On October 14, Reuters reported that Ukraine was experiencing problems with Starlink's military-grade Starshield service and US-provided warning information, while European allies lacked ready-made alternatives capable of replacing critical American capabilities.
The causes and circumstances of individual service disruptions must be established carefully. But the broader vulnerability is undeniable:
Europe cannot exercise full strategic discretion when essential capabilities depend on companies and systems it does not control.
This is the problem behind the EU's drive for technological sovereignty, including proposed requirements for sensitive cloud services and efforts to help European technology companies expand. Additionally, this highlights the importance of diversification; a market with several credible suppliers gives governments more options than one dominated by a provider whose decisions may be affected by another country's political priorities.
The objective need not be to exclude American companies. It is to ensure that European governments can make decisions without fearing that a disagreement will leave them technologically exposed.
Washington's turn toward Moscow is only stoking the fire
The question has become more urgent because American and European policies toward Russia are diverging.
European governments continue to tighten sanctions and target the networks used to circumvent them. On October 12, the EU added hundreds of companies and hundreds of individuals associated with Russia's military-industrial complex to its sanctions framework. On October 15, it imposed further measures against individuals and entities involved in circumventing restrictions on sanctioned goods, oil and financial transactions.
Trump, meanwhile, has defended delaying new US sanctions against Russia, arguing that he wants to keep Moscow engaged in negotiations. His administration has also pursued a controversial arrangement involving Russian diesel imports.
Washington's stated rationale is that engagement can help secure a negotiated end to the war. European governments, confronting Russia's aggression on their continent, have continued to emphasise pressure and support for Ukraine.
These positions are not identical, and Europe itself is not unanimous on every aspect of Russia policy. Nevertheless, the divergence has consequences. If European security depends on American capabilities while Washington's policy toward Moscow becomes less predictable, Europe's dependence carries a greater political and military risk.
The problem is not simply that Washington may change its mind. It is that Europe may lack the means to respond independently when it does.
Carney gave the warning a name
Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney articulated this danger in his September 17 address to the European Parliament. Economic integration, he warned, was being weaponised; tariffs were becoming instruments of pressure; financial mechanisms could be used coercively; and supply chains had become vulnerabilities to exploit.
His argument was not that Canada or Europe should retreat into isolation. It was that sovereignty requires resilience, and resilience requires cooperation among countries capable of building alternatives together.
Carney called for deeper Canada-EU cooperation in critical minerals, defence, artificial intelligence, computing, energy security, space and payments. He argued that partners could combine their strengths to create an alliance in which no single power could dictate the choices of the others.
The message challenged a comfortable assumption: that close economic ties with the United States would always translate into dependable strategic protection.
Carney did not invent Europe's concerns about technological sovereignty. European policymakers had already been working on the problem. But his intervention gave the challenge a broader political framework: dependence becomes dangerous when the relationship that once delivered prosperity can also be used to impose costs.
Canada faces a parallel dilemma. Its economy remains deeply integrated with that of the United States, yet Trump's trade threats and rhetoric about Canadian sovereignty have strengthened the case for diversifying trade and building domestic capacity. For both Canada and Europe, the objective is not to abandon the relationship but to reduce the leverage that comes from having too few alternatives.
Diversification is insurance against uncertainty
Washington argues that Europe risks undermining competition by favoring domestic companies and imposing heavy regulations on American technology firms. This argument deserves careful examination; European technological policy should not simply become a form of protectionism, nor should governments assume that a European supplier is inherently more reliable or effective.
But the reverse is equally true. Calling every effort to develop alternatives protectionism ignores the risks created by concentrated dependence.
Diversification costs money. Building satellite networks, computing capacity and defence industries requires years of investment. It cannot provide an immediate replacement for every American capability. Yet the cost of redundancy must be weighed against the cost of having no viable alternative during a political or military crisis.
The same principle applies to energy, supply chains and trade. Dependence on a single supplier may be efficient under stable conditions, but efficiency can become a liability when geopolitical conditions change.
Europe does not need to choose between America and isolation. It needs enough capacity to work with the United States without being compelled to accept every American demand. That is the practical meaning of strategic autonomy.
The Starlink dispute has brought the issue into sharp relief. Washington says Europe should cooperate rather than erect barriers to American technology. Europe says it needs more suppliers and greater control over critical infrastructure. Both sides invoke competition, but they disagree over whether the existing balance of power leaves Europe sufficiently free to act.
The answer will not be found in rhetoric alone. It will be measured by whether Europe can build credible alternatives, diversify its partnerships and maintain essential services when political interests diverge.
An alliance is strongest when its members choose cooperation because it serves their interests, not because dependence leaves them no other option.
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