Lessons from Ukraine: Never Trust National Security in Private Hands

By Yiannis Damellos and Mars Strangelove Jr.

October 24, 2026

Illustration: Gemini

Photo: REUTERS

The lesson for every Western government is clear: When a billionaire controls technology essential to national defence, a nation's sovereignty becomes conditional not only on corporate decisions, but also on the personal choices of one powerful individual.

Ukraine has just received a lesson that Western governments should have learned long ago. Never allow a private company to become an indispensable part of your national defence without guarantees that the company cannot unilaterally undermine it. For more than a week, restrictions on SpaceX's Starlink satellite communications system and its military counterpart, Starshield, disrupted Ukrainian military operations. Kyiv reported difficulties intercepting Russian attack drones, interruptions to frontline communications and the cancellation of some operations. On October 24, Ukraine said the systems had returned to the operating speeds it needed. The immediate disruption may be over, but the fundamental problem remains.

Elon Musk subsequently acknowledged that SpaceX had throttled Starlink in Ukraine, arguing that the civilian service had been used for offensive drone strikes in violation of its terms. He said the loophole had been closed. That is his justification, and it deserves to be reported. But it does not settle the separate question of the restrictions affecting Starshield, the military-grade system developed for government and national-security customers. Reuters reported that the order to limit Starshield came from inside the White House, citing two U.S. officials and a Western official. The sources did not identify the person responsible. Musk has maintained that the U.S. government controls Starshield restrictions. The result was catastrophic: Ukraine's military suddenly found itself struggling with technology on which its operations depend.

And then came the public blame game. Musk pointed to Ukraine's alleged violation of his company's terms. U.S. officials denied that the president had ordered the restrictions. The White House and Musk traded responsibility while Ukraine sought explanations and its military dealt with the consequences. President Donald Trump later said that if the problems persisted, he would “get it straightened out.” The systems subsequently returned to the required operating speeds. Yet the public still deserves a clear account of who ordered what, under which authority, and with what safeguards. A dispute involving the battlefield communications of a country fighting for its survival cannot be treated like an ordinary disagreement between a supplier and a customer.

The principle should be straightforward: a company that provides critical infrastructure must be accountable for the obligations it undertakes. Naturally, no private supplier can guarantee that technology will function perfectly under every wartime condition, but there is a difference between an unavoidable technical failure and a deliberate restriction of a service that a military depends upon. Contracts, operating rules, emergency procedures, and independent oversight must address that difference, and where a provider violates legal obligations or recklessly endangers lives, there should be meaningful consequences under the applicable law. National security cannot depend on the personal goodwill of a corporate executive, however innovative or influential he may be.

The longer-term answer is not necessarily for every country to manufacture every satellite, processor, or communications terminal itself, but to ensure that no private company can become an irreplaceable single point of failure. 

Therefore, governments need alternative communications networks, domestic technological capacity, diversified suppliers, and the ability to maintain essential military operations if a contractor withdraws access. Canada is already distancing itself from Musk. The Europeans too. But if they have to work with Musk or any Musk, they must be ready to enforce contractual protections and authorize intervention when a private decision threatens national security. Specifically, Europe, whose officials have been rattled by the restrictions, now has another reason to accelerate the development of its own military satellite communications capabilities. Strategic independence is expensive. Discovering that you do not possess it during a war can be considerably more expensive.

There is also a question of political accountability. Private companies have legitimate commercial interests, and governments have the right to establish rules governing the use of technology they purchase or license. But when corporate decisions and government orders become entangled, the public must be able to establish who made the decision and who bears responsibility for its consequences. And although we have no established evidence that Musk restricted the service in exchange for a third-party gift, and such an allegation should not be made without proof, we do have a documented disruption, competing explanations, and a system whose reliability is vital to Ukraine's defence. Those facts alone demand scrutiny, and we should also keep in mind that accountability should not depend on which side has the greater political influence. Because political influence is a warm gun.

The consequences extend beyond Ukraine, as its allies watching this dispute must now consider whether their own critical systems could be exposed to similar uncertainty. Whatever the ultimate findings about this episode, the damage to confidence is real enough to require a response.

And there is one final lesson for Washington, Silicon Valley and every government tempted to confuse private innovation with public security: what goes around comes around. A country that accepts dangerous dependencies today may discover tomorrow that someone else controls the switch. The same technology that gives an ally an advantage can become a vulnerability if access depends on decisions it cannot influence. Today it is Ukraine. Tomorrow it could be another COUNTRY, another battlefield, or a critical domestic service. The answer is not to abandon private enterprise. It is to make sure that the protection of human life and national sovereignty never rests on the goodwill of a single company. Governments exist to serve the public, and national security is too important to outsource without safeguards.