Saudi Arabia Is Running Out of Strategic Depth
Saudi Arabia was drawn into the Iran war hoping that its new regional alliances would provide strategic depth. Instead, seven months into the conflict, the kingdom is confronting something much more dangerous: the war is moving toward its own territory, its energy infrastructure is being hit, its Red Sea access is under pressure, and the partners whose military weight was supposed to multiply Saudi power have so far stopped short of entering the fight.
The deterioration is measurable. Iran-aligned Houthi forces have expanded their position along Yemen's Red Sea coast, capturing the strategic port of Mokha and several islands near the Bab el-Mandeb, including Perim and parts of the Hanish archipelago. They have simultaneously intensified missile and drone attacks against Saudi targets. Saudi warplanes are now striking Yemen, while the Houthis are striking back at Saudi Arabia. The result is a dangerous convergence: the kingdom faces pressure from the south while Iran continues to contest the Strait of Hormuz to the east.
More serious still is the damage to the kingdom's oil-export architecture. A drone attack damaged three pumping stations along Saudi Arabia's 1,200-kilometre East-West pipeline, forcing the route to shut down, while operations at the Red Sea port of Yanbu were disrupted. The pipeline normally provides Saudi Arabia with a crucial alternative to the Strait of Hormuz. Reuters reports that Saudi Aramco has now told at least two European refiners that their October crude deliveries will be halted because of the disruption.
That changes the strategic equation. Saudi Arabia built the East-West route precisely because dependence on Hormuz represented a vulnerability. Now that alternative route is itself under attack. Riyadh is attempting to compensate by moving some crude through ship-to-ship transfers near Oman's Sohar port and by restoring part of the pipeline's capacity. But the repairs are expected to take weeks, with Aramco reportedly targeting a partial restart within days and a return to full capacity in roughly six weeks.
A Meme Alliance
And this is where the Mecca Agreement meets reality. Pakistan has publicly said it is prepared to defend Saudi Arabia, and Turkey remains formally part of the new security arrangement. But Pakistan has also said there had been no discussion of a military response to the Houthi attacks under the agreement. That ambiguity is precisely what Riyadh now has to confront: a defense pact can create political solidarity without automatically producing troops, aircraft or a willingness to enter a wider war with Iran.
The most revealing development may therefore be diplomatic rather than military. Saudi Arabia has turned to China and asked Beijing to use its influence with Tehran to restrain the Houthis. Reuters reports that China subsequently urged Iran to limit attacks on Saudi oil infrastructure. Iran's response, according to the same reporting, was essentially that the broader conflict with the United States and Israel must be addressed. In other words, Riyadh is now asking a major power outside the traditional American security structure to help protect the kingdom from a war unfolding within the American security structure.
The consequences extend beyond Saudi Arabia. Brent crude settled at $104.87 a barrel on Sept. 18, after briefly rising above $109 earlier in the week. The Strait of Hormuz remains severely disrupted, while the Houthis' expanding position around Bab el-Mandeb threatens another major maritime chokepoint. At the same time, the United States is paying an increasingly visible price for the wider war: the Pentagon's publicly acknowledged casualty count is being challenged by reporting from The Washington Post, while the conflict continues to consume enormous quantities of U.S. munitions and resources.
For Riyadh, the fundamental problem is no longer simply how to defeat the Houthis. It is how to prevent the Iran war from turning Saudi Arabia into one of its principal economic and strategic casualties. The kingdom's Vision 2030 transformation depends on stability, investment, tourism, infrastructure, and reliable energy exports. A prolonged conflict that simultaneously threatens its cities, oil infrastructure and maritime routes works directly against those objectives. And the more Saudi Arabia escalates against the Houthis, the greater the risk that its remaining energy infrastructure becomes a target.
Yet, an uncomfortable irony stands at the center of it all. Saudi Arabia assembled a new regional security architecture because it feared being left exposed in a changing Middle East. But the war is exposing precisely how difficult it is to turn diplomatic agreements into military protection once the missiles begin flying. Saudi Arabia may have acquired more partners. What it has not yet acquired is a solution to its problems — or an exit from this war.
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