Financial Times: The EU needs a clearer strategy for partners like Canada

Bloc should define what it can offer to prosperous fellow democracies
FINANCIAL TIMES
THE EDITORIAL BOARD
Published SEP 27 2026
You can read the original HERE
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There was one message the leaders of Canada and the European Commission were keen to hammer home in their back-to-back speeches earlier this month: they are not going to take the dismantling of the rules-based international order lying down. In Strasbourg, Mark Carney and Ursula von der Leyen vowed to create a deeper alliance to make their economies more resilient and their sovereignty more effective. It was enough to rile up Donald Trump — but what it all means has yet to be decided.

In October, an EU-Canada summit is set to put policy flesh on the rhetorical bones. The two sides should set their ambitions high: they complement each other in so many areas that there are big benefits to be reaped. Energy resources and critical raw materials are in great demand in Europe and in ample supply in Canada. The large EU market offers much-needed diversification for a country badly buffeted by its neighbour’s erratic and domineering trade policy. Both sides have great capacities in technological development that they want to make less dependent on the US or China. They share geopolitical interests in the Arctic, and could collaborate more in defence industrial policy. Progress on any of these would make for a worthwhile summit.

Still, the potential should not be overhyped. Von der Leyen misjudged by inviting Canada “to be the first associate member of the EU”. No such thing exists, and the mention unwisely took capitals by surprise (Berlin had even been promoting an entirely different proposal with the same label as a way to gradually absorb Ukraine into the bloc). More importantly, it suggests a much deeper degree of integration than Canada is contemplating.

Any notion of EU membership inevitably comes with pooling of sovereignty to benefit from strictly aligned policies. Canada is not interested in the former and cannot go very far on the latter — joining the EU’s single market, for example — without raising trade barriers with the US that would be so costly they would make Brexit look like a walk in the park.

A more modest but more realistic partnership would be enough. Beyond the substance of any collaborations that might be agreed, it would show success for Carney’s “middle powers” agenda. It would also undo some of the damage sustained to the EU’s credibility from its members’ failure to fully ratify a decade-old EU-Canada trade agreement.

At the same time, the EU must see its evolving relations with Canada in the context of what it can offer to a broader range of countries, such as the UK, Norway, Switzerland and Turkey, where membership is not on the horizon but where closer co-operation is imperative. The EU’s approach instead seems to be ad hoc bilateralism with each of them. This risks missing the opportunity for more deliberate strategic leadership.

If the EU wants to shape the changing economic world order, it should clarify the collaborative benefits it is willing to offer — from more ambitious access to the single market to more modest inclusion in its emerging “made in Europe” policy for preferential subsidies and public procurement. It should clarify, too, what reciprocal, legally binding commitments it expects in return.

None of this, moreover, should overshadow the crucial task of bringing in those countries that do want to become members. That means Ukraine above all, as well as nations such as Montenegro that are doing all they can to meet the EU’s strict accession criteria. This is harder than finding common ground with partners such as Canada — but also a greater test for the EU’s strategic relevance.