This UN General Assembly is A spectacle Worth Watching

By Yiannis Damellos

Sources: CBS News and Agencies

September 21, 2026

I never thought I'd say that. But I can't wait for the upcoming United Nations General Assembly, especially if the Iranians show up 

I was not born when Khrushchev rocked the boat in 1960, shoe-brandishing and screaming in Russian against the "jerk,  stooge, and toady of American imperialism" Philippine delegate Lorenzo Sumulong, but I've seen the replays. Those were the days — when today's hegemon had an equal adversary. Well, Iran has not been an easy one either, nowadays, and it has managed to stand its ground in real wartime, not merely in anticipation of a first hit. That makes this UN spectacle worth watching.

The diplomacy surrounding the Iran War has entered a strange and dangerous phase. On one hand, Donald Trump is threatening further escalation, while on the other, he is discussing the possibility of negotiations. Been here, seen that. Iran, for its part, is controlling the damage, preparing for a prolonged conflict with the help of its proxy armies, and has relayed conditions for reopening the Strait of Hormuz through mediators. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia—one of Washington's key regional allies—is seeking support from Israel these days, now that the Americans have backed off, raising questions about what it might offer in return if oil is not part of the equation.

President Masoud Pezeshkian is scheduled to travel to New York this week to attend the United Nations General Assembly, where he is expected to speak about the war and its regional consequences. In a notable development, President Donald Trump has indicated that he is “probably” open to meeting with him. However, Trump has also mentioned considering extreme measures, such as “wiping Iran out,” and has asked when he should “blow the entire nation up.” The juxtaposition is striking: Washington is threatening further escalation even as both sides leave open the possibility of diplomacy.

Even the diplomacy is arriving under extraordinary circumstances. Iranian state media reported Monday that the United States refused visas to members of Pezeshkian's communications team, preventing them from accompanying him to New York. The United States has permitted the Iranian delegation to attend the General Assembly, but the visa dispute has added another layer of confrontation to a week in which the two countries may nevertheless find themselves in the same diplomatic arena. Tehran says it has already transmitted conditions for reopening the Strait of Hormuz through mediators, including an end to the war, the release of frozen Iranian funds and an end to the U.S. naval blockade.

But while Washington and Tehran argue over diplomacy, the war is changing on the ground. The Houthis, backed by Iran, have made major gains along Yemen's Red Sea coast and around the Bab el-Mandeb, one of the world's most important maritime chokepoints. Reuters reports that Houthi forces have seized strategically important territory and islands, while Saudi-backed Yemeni forces have suffered major setbacks. More than 130,000 people have been displaced by the renewed fighting, according to the International Organization for Migration. The Houthis have also attacked Saudi targets, including energy infrastructure, while Riyadh has been forced to defend territory and vital export routes at the same time that Hormuz remains severely disrupted.

That is where the Saudi story becomes intriguing. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has repeatedly asked Trump for military assistance against the Houthis. Trump considered U.S. strikes and ordered preparations, but the administration ultimately backed away. On Sunday, Trump spoke with Yemen's internationally recognized president, who again sought American military support, but Trump made no commitment. Reuters reported that Washington has been reluctant to open another front while the United States remains engaged in the war with Iran.

So Riyadh has begun looking elsewhere. Saudi Arabia and Israel have been engaged in U.S.-mediated discussions over Israeli intelligence assistance against the Houthis, according to regional diplomatic sources and Israeli reporting. The reported assistance is currently focused on intelligence, surveillance, and defense rather than an Israeli combat role. Axios reported that Israel and Saudi Arabia, with CENTCOM's assistance, were discussing support modeled partly on Israeli intelligence assistance to the United Arab Emirates.

This raises a much larger diplomatic question. What does Saudi Arabia have to offer Israel in return? One obvious possibility is progress toward normalization. But that is where the Palestinian question enters the equation. Saudi Arabia has repeatedly tied normalization with Israel to progress on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, while the Trump administration's emerging postwar strategy reportedly includes both an expanded regional alignment against Iran and a Saudi-Israeli normalization agreement. The administration is therefore already trying to connect several pieces of the regional puzzle.

There is no evidence yet that Riyadh has offered Israel specific concessions over Gaza, or over anything else, in exchange for military assistance. But the sequence is worth watching. First, Saudi Arabia asked Washington for help, and Washington declined direct military intervention, offering intelligence and targeting assistance instead. Then came reports of Saudi-Israeli talks mediated by CENTCOM, with Israeli intelligence capabilities potentially helping Riyadh address the Houthi threat. At the same time, Washington is pursuing a broader regional architecture in which Saudi-Israeli normalization remains one of the central pieces.

That does not prove a Gaza-for-security bargain. But it creates a diplomatic environment in which security cooperation, normalization and the Palestinian question could become intertwined. And if those interests eventually collide, the question is whether Palestinian political demands would be treated as a condition of the deal — or as the price to be negotiated away.

The irony is that the diplomatic track and the military track are now moving in opposite directions. Pezeshkian is going to the U.N. while Iran warns that another American attack will expand the geography of the war. Trump says he might meet the Iranian president while threatening Iran with annihilation. Washington is talking to the Houthis even as Saudi Arabia is fighting them. And Saudi Arabia, once overwhelmingly dependent on American security guarantees, is quietly exploring what Israel can provide.

"Now, you may ask yourselves: Even if Trump and Pezeshkian manage to reach an agreement regarding Iran, what will the new Middle Eastern security system look like after such a catastrophic war? If Saudi Arabia concludes that American protection is conditional, and Israel recognizes that Saudi security needs can advance normalization, while Iran retains leverage through both the Strait of Hormuz and the Houthis, won't the alliances that emerge from this conflict appear very different from those that existed before? This may be the most consequential diplomatic story of all: the war may eventually end, but the alliances forged during seven months of conflict could profoundly redraw the map of the Middle East."